When Anaxagoras developed his philosophy in. the middle of the fifth century B. C., th e objects of sense perception we re under attack. Heraclitus had denounced the 1Nea kness of sense perception and called upon men to observe his logos which was both an aci ;ount or explanation of the universe and the principle according to which it was organized. Parmenides separated being from the sensibles and argued that the latter were objects of opinion rather than of knowledge. Erotagoras went even further. If we are to use Plato's �£�££1�11.!. §. as evidence, he argued that the sensibles were relation s.
They were relative to each percipient and even to the condition of a percipient at a particu lar moment. Since individuals had different sensations of the same object, the object itself did not have the qualities attributed to it. If one per son said that something was hot, and another that it was cold, it was neither hot nor cold .
The &rgument may have been applied to entities as well as to sensi'bles. As Aristotle wrote (�. 1007bl8-26), if an entity seemed to one person to be a trireme, it was a trireme; if it seemed. to be a wa.11, it was a wall.
Could objects of sense perc eption be equated with being, without 'breaking any part of Parmenides ' canon? To what extent were sense J;.lfJrceptions unrel iab le? These were the questions which Anaxagoras had to answer.
The heart of Anaxagoras' philosophy i� t,;o be found in his thesis l f that there is no smallest, It ma y h a ve been devel oped f r o i;n o ne Zeno's arguments. Zeno wrote that if there were many, being is infinite, for there are al ways others between those things which are 2 and again others between these (29 B 3). He meant that there could never be a void in which being was not for in thi:s case·::being would have not being as its boundary. It followed from this that there was not a smallest, for if' we assL1me that there is a smallest of either an entity such as gold or a quality such as hot, we must suppose that there is something below.th at minimum which is not gold or hot. This wo uld transgress Parmenides' canon that it is not possible for being not to be.
Several conclusions follow from the premiss that ther e is not a.
smallest. If ther e is no smallest, it would be impossible to separate an entity or a quality from another entity or quality since the very act of separation presumed a smallest. In this way all thi.ngs ·would be in all.
The entity, therefore, was composed of all entities and qualities.
The component entities which determined the individuality of the entity predominated over all other component entities, but not in a mathematical ratio. Since the seed par took of th e nature of the entity, it too must have been a composite of all qualities and entities.
The continuum wh\ich .Anaxagoras postulated was consistent with Parmenides' requirements for being. Parmenides argue d that being was not divisible since it was all the same (28 B 8,22) , and that it was continuous (28 B 8,6 and 25). The continuum, however, was composed of the objects of sense per ception.
2 All references to the fragments of Anaxagoras: are to be found in 6 (Berlin, 1952).
one another (59 B 10). Birth, therefore, took place when the mixture of the components was suc h that the entity about to be realized predominated in it, and death was the dissolution of the mixture and the return of the components to the mass.
Growth was due to the addition of parts, similar to those which predominated in the entity, from the nourishment which the entity as a matter of fact, in the wood, but iln so small a portion that it could not contribute to the growth of flesh.
Change of quality was likewise explained in terms of th e mixture and separation which takes place within the entity (59 A 52).
Since anything which shared in the mixture permeated the whole, Anaxagoras carefully separated his nous from th e cosmo s. ''Mind,'' he wrote, "is infinite and sel f-ruling and not mixed vrith anything, but it is alone by itself. For if it were not by itself, but had been mixed with something else, it would have &bared in all things, if it had been mixed with anything ( 59 B 12). '' We might notice also that mind is never an object of sense perception an d th e mixture was composed onl¥ of such objects. In this way Anaxagoras made a considerable advance over Heraclitus since Heraclitus' logos was.
identified with the fiery process by which one opposite was exchanged for another (22 B 90).
From the th esis that there was no smal lest followed the unity of opposites, In my earlier a.�ticle, I argued that large and small were inseparable because they were infinite in degree. The same conclusion appears to hold true for th e cosmie opposite s. Anaxagoras write!i', "Things in the cosmos ha ve not been separated from one another nor has the warm been cut of f from the cold with an axe nor the cold from the w�rm ( 59 B 8)."
v.re can infer that the opposites whiah were cosmic were found in entities ulso. � piece of iron, for instance, could be hot or cold.
Presumably the hot and the cold were though t to mix with the iron.
Both Heraolitus and Anaxagoras accepted the reality of the world ,· of sense perception an d turned their attent ion to the principles inherent in it. But warring opposites, restrained by a limit or logos, and being exchanged each for the other , were much too primitive for Anaxagoras. He saw, by a stroke of genius, th at the opposites were one becaus e there was no smallest, and that they were consequently infinite in degree and inseparable.
More light on the opposites is found in another fragme nt of Anaxagoras in which he wrote, "To itself each is both large and small (59 B 3)." As I pointed out in my earlier artic le, the
antithesis of 'l'f'o� <:�vro is, of course,itY'o'� 9 \..1.l.,•. Anaxagoras was arguing that J. while every entity is smal l or large when compared with another entity, when no comparis on is made the entity is both large and small. Similarly, an entity would be both sw eet and bitter.
From this pass age we can inf�r .Anaxagoras' an�Ner to Protagoras.
The opposites an d the qualities were existents, and not, as Protagoras had believed, relations. The y were not rel ative to the pe rcipient. Perhaps Anaxagoras might have argued also that an entity if it seemed to be a tri�eme to one person and a wall to another 'Pas both a trireme an d a wall.,
In two passages Anaxagor as uses bla ck and white as examples. In one he argued that snow was blacl\:. Snow was frozen ·w·ater, and water was black; therefore, snow also was black (59 A 97). Elsewhere he stated that we are not able to judge th e truth because of the weakness of our sense perceptions. He illustrated this by taking l � two colors, ba �ck and white, and pouring one into the other drop by drop. The sight, he said, could not di stinguish the gradual change of coror • . These statements illustrate the inseparability of the opposites, black and white, and the weakness of sense perception.
Sense perception was unreliable because, although an entity had both opposites, the senses could distinguish only one.
It is possible also that Anaxagoras found unity in th e parts of the spectrum. He refered to the seeds as having all kinds of shapes, colors and flavors (59 B 4). Although it is possible from the wording of the Greek to infer that eo.ch seed had on e shape, color and flavor, I do not think that this is what is meant. The experiment which was made by pouring black and white into each other drop by drop could be made with adjacent colors in the spectrum, such as blue and green or orange and red, and the result would have been similar. It could be infe�d. and, I believe, was infe�d by Anaxagoras, although there is no evidence for this, that each color was in ever y other the primaev�l separation, but played no part in the numerous separations which take place as each animal '�d plant 0omes'to birth.
As Socra tea complained in the fil1�� • . Anaxagoras did not make any use ,·.! of his nous at all.
Man possessed a sense perception wh ic h was weak and inadequate, but by observation and analogy from the sense objects he could draw some conclusions about those things which were not clear (59 B 2la).
Induction and deduction we�e available fo r him, as they were to Anaxagoras in the construction of his system.
To conclude, then, Anaxagoras held that the objects of sense perception, both entities and qualities, were existents, and not rela�ive to the percipient, and that they formed a continuum which observed the criteria of Parmenides' being. Birth, dissolution, growth and change of quality were explained in terms of combination and separation. The opposites were inseparable and infinite in degree, and the parts of the spectrum were one. The opposites were used to. account.
for sense perception as well as fo r pleasure and pain. Since animals and plants are all the pro duct of the same natural process, they are essentially alike. Man lives in a world whioh ha'3 no purpose and no god, but, by means of observation, experience and analogy he is able to draw some conclusions about the kind of world in which he lives and about his own nature. Although Anaxagoras' thesis left many proble�, it wa. s perhaps one of th e most brilliant solutions in Presooratic philosophy.
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